Alignment
Alignment is the set of techniques and constraints that shape model behavior toward intended objectives, *intended* being a governance variable, not a foundational assumption.
The alignment object
The codex defines alignment as the constraint that, for any input in the deployment distribution and any output produced by the model,
where is the *acceptance set*, the set of outputs consistent with the policy's declared values and constraints. The acceptance set is not a fixed function; it is a published artifact updated by governance.
Alignment is therefore not a single training procedure. It is a triple: (declared values, training procedure, deployment-time enforcement). The codex specifies each.
Declared values
Values are declared as a structured document of *constraints* and *preferences*:
- Constraints are inviolable: the model refuses to act outside them, even at the cost of task failure. Example: "Do not produce content optimized for biological weapons synthesis."
- Preferences are soft: the model prefers outputs within them but may produce others under sufficient countervailing reason. Example: "Prefer outputs that decline rather than fabricate when uncertain."
The values document is on-chain. Changes require a constitutional-class governance proposal.
Training procedures
Alignment training proceeds in three stages.
Stage 1: Supervised fine-tuning (SFT). The base model is fine-tuned on demonstrations of aligned behavior. Loss is standard cross-entropy:
Stage 2: Reward-model-free preference optimization (DPO). The codex uses direct preference optimization rather than RLHF-with-reward-model. Given preference pairs :
DPO avoids training a separate reward model and the policy-drift instabilities of RLHF, at the cost of requiring preference data that better covers the policy's actual output distribution. Both DPO and RLHF have been validated for the codex's regime; DPO is preferred for its operational simplicity and its tractable theoretical guarantees.
Stage 3: Constitutional self-critique. The model evaluates its own outputs against the values document and, when self-critique flags a violation, regenerates. This is computed at training time as an auxiliary loss and at inference time as a configurable filter.
Deployment-time enforcement
Training alone cannot guarantee alignment. The codex layers three deployment-time checks:
- Pre-emission filter. Output candidates are scored against a small (≤ 1B param) alignment classifier; candidates below threshold are resampled or refused.
- Surface-specific constraints. Each surface enforces its own constraints (e.g., the embodiment surface refuses motor commands that exceed declared force limits).
- Audit logging. A configurable fraction of outputs are logged with their full latent state for post-hoc review.
These checks are observable, configurable, and themselves subject to governance.
Why DPO over RLHF
Two reasons.
Stability. RLHF optimizes a policy against a learned reward model. As the policy improves, it can exploit reward-model errors, *reward hacking*. DPO trains the policy directly against the preference data, removing the intermediate optimization target.
Decentralization. A reward model is a piece of infrastructure that must be hosted, served, and kept in sync. DPO requires only the preference dataset, which is content-addressed.
Verification
Alignment claims are verifiable:
- Constraint coverage. A frozen suite of red-team prompts is run against every alignment-trained checkpoint; the failure rate is published.
- Preference adherence. A held-out preference set measures DPO's preference satisfaction rate.
- Refusal calibration. A test set with known-acceptable and known-unacceptable prompts measures the rate of incorrect refusal and incorrect compliance separately.
A checkpoint that regresses on any of these is not promoted to the active routing table.
Limits
The codex does not claim that alignment is *solved* by these techniques. It claims that they are the current best-available techniques and that the network is engineered to integrate stronger techniques as they are developed. Specifically:
- Alignment of capabilities the model does not yet have (e.g., long-horizon planning at superhuman scale) is unaddressed by SFT + DPO + constitutional methods. The codex's response is conservative: deployment is restricted to capabilities for which alignment has been empirically validated.
- Alignment under distribution shift remains an open problem.
These limits are stated in the values document and referenced by the deployment-time enforcement layer.